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Research Note: Interest Groups 
and the Intergovernmental Im-
plementation of Environmental 
Policy in Canada and the United 
States□ 
David R. Shock 
Kennesaw State University 
This research note develops a conceptual framework 
based on insights and key findings in much of the litera-
ture describing the behaviors of interest groups during 
the intergovernmental implementation of environmental 
regulatory policies in two federal political systems, Can-
ada and the United States. Two variables identified in the 
literature are used to construct the framework: the level 
of fragmentation in a political system, and the level of 
discretion possesed by subnational governments. Combin-
ing these factors identifies four categories of interest 
group activities , here termed bargaining, legislative lob-
bying, multiple institutional lobbying, and intergovern-
mental lobbying. The framework is intended to serve as a 
foundation for future studies of interest groups during 
the intergovernmental implementation of environmental 
policies in North America. 
In Canada and the United States, interest groups are important political actors throughout the environmental policymaking process. Interest groups identify policy problems, formulate 
policy alternatives, lobby for the adoption of particular policy 
alternatives, influence policy implementation, and produce and 
interpret policy evaluations. Of special importance is the fact that 
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interest groups play a crucial role in both promoting and ob-
structing policy objectives during the implementation of public 
policies (e.g., Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981, 1989; Sabatier 
1986; Hayes 1992; and Goggin et al. 1990). Drawing on relevant 
literature, I develop a conceptual framework that serves to organ-
ize our thinking about the behaviors of interest groups during the 
intergovernmental implementation of environmental regulatory 
policies in two federal political systems, Canada and the United 
States. The framework is intended to serve as a foundation for 
future studies of interest group activities during the intergovern-
mental implementation of environmental policies in North Amer-
ica. Understanding interest group policy implementation 
activities in Canada and the United States is important because 
both countries are currently implementing agreements to protect 
the North American environment, such as the Great Lakes Water 
Quality Agreement (GLWQA) of 1972. 1 
Both Canada and the United States have federal political sys-
tems characterized by a constitutional division of power between 
a central government and subnational governments. While simi -
larities exist between Canada and the United States, the political 
dynamics surrounding the adoption and implementation of envi-
ronmental policy in these two countries are very different. In the 
United States, environmental policymaking is more centralized 
1 
The GLWQA was signed by Canada and the United States in I 972 in response to pollu-
tion threats to the Great Lakes region. Both countries agreed to reduce the release of toxic 
substances, such as phosphorus , into the water and to promote environmental cleanup 
efforts. The international treaty was renewed and amended in 1978 and 1987. Implemen-
tation of the GLWQA in the United States is coordinated by the federal Environme ntal 
Protection Agency in close cooperation with state and local governments. In Canada , 
implementation efforts are led by Environment Canada, the federal environmental protec-
tion agency, in conjunction with provincial governments (most notably the Province of 
Ontario). A bi-national organization, the International Joint Commission, is responsible 
under the GLWQA for assessing and publicly reporting both nations ' compliance with 
the provisions of the agreement. 
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m the national government than it is in Canada because of con-
stitutional and other factors. The national Supremacy Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution authorizes the federal government to pre-
empt state public policies and action that are inconsistent with 
federal policy objectives, while the broad interpretation of the 
ommerce Clause permits the federal government to regulate 
state and local government actions affecting interstate com-
merce. In addition , the U.S. government 's ownership of public 
lands and control of natural resources gives it direct jurisdiction 
over large areas of the country, including two-thirds of the west-
ern United States (Holland , 1996, 3). 
While the national government in the United States is dom i-
nant in environmental policy, an important distinguishing aspect 
of Canadian federalism is the extent to which the province s hold 
the reigns of environmental policymaking. There arc a number o f 
reasons for this. First , Section 109 of the Constitution Act of 
1867 grants the provinces, rather than the federal government , 
ownership of public lands and natural resource s in Canada 
(Cairns , 1992, 55, 57-58). Second , the Canadian Con stitution 
does not contain a national supremacy clause similar to the 
American version. As a result, the federal government in Canad a 
lacks the constitutional authority to use coercive tools to force 
provincial compliance with national environmental objective s. 
Third , the federal government in Canada is limited in enactin g 
environmental laws because the Canadian Supreme Court has 
interpreted narrowly the clause in the Canadian Constituti on 
permitting the federal government to regulate interprovinci al 
trade (Holland , 1996, 3). Finally , separati st forces in Queb c re-
strain the federal government in Ottawa from centrali zing regula-
tion of the environment. 
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PUBLIC POLICY FRAMEWORKS AND INTEREST GROUP ACTIVITY 
During the post-World War II era, various scholars studied the 
relationship of interest groups to the public policy process in the 
United States. For instance, E. E. Schattschneider in The 
Semisovereign People (l 960) argued that powerful interests seek 
to limit and control conflict in order to promote the enactment 
and maintenance of policies favoring a small minority in society. 
Later in time, Theodore Lowi, Ripley and Franklin, and James 
Q. Wilson all developed influential frameworks for understand-
ing interest groups and the degree of conflict that occurs with 
different types of public policy. Lowi (1964) studied how interest 
groups react differently to distributive, regulatory, and redistribu-
tive policies. He found that policies that distribute benefits 
widely to the population generate less conflict among interest 
groups than regulatory policies that punish certain groups, such 
as polluters, and redistributive policies that reallocate societal 
resources from one group to another. Ripley and Franklin (1987) 
created a related typology of public policies that divided Lowi's 
regulatory policy classification into "competitive" and "protec-
tive regulatory" policy categories. According to Ripley and 
Franklin (1987, 24), competitive regulatory policies, such as the 
licensing of radio and television stations, "are aimed at limiting 
the provision of specific goods and services to only one or a few 
designated deliverers, who are chosen from a larger number of 
competing potential deliverers," while protective regulatory 
policies, such as environmental protection laws, "are designed to 
protect the public by setting the conditions under which various 
private activities can be undertaken." Conflict, bargaining , com-
promise, and shifting group coalitions characterize the relation-
ships among the competing interest groups involved in protective 
regulatory policymaking (Ripley and Franklin 1987, 22-23, 143-
144). 
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Another perspective was developed by James Q. Wilson 
( 1973; 1980), who found that the activities of interest group s 
depend on whether the benefits and costs of a policy are concen-
trated or distributed. So-cal led "concentrated benefits " refer s to a 
narrow distribution of policy benefits, such as subsidies to one or 
a small number of groups that clearly represent a minority in so-
ciety, while "concentrated costs " refers to the distribution of the 
costs of a policy , such as through income taxes , to a small num-
ber of people or group s. On the other hand , "distributed bene-
fits" refer to policy benefits flowing to large groups in soc iety, 
such as the mortgage interest income tax deduction , while "d is-
tributed costs " refer to the policy being paid by most members of 
society, such as Social Security and Medicare taxes. Wilson 
(1980 , 367-370) found that public policies that concentr ate the 
costs of a policy tend to generate more group conflict than poli -
cies that force everyone to share the burden. Policies whose costs 
are widely distributed , but whose benefits are narrowl y directed 
toward a particular group , such as farmers , often do not create 
significant conflict. 
INTEREST GROUPS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
IMPLEMENTATION IN THE U.S. AND CANADA 
For some time , the activities of interest groups in policym ak-
ing in the United States were explained by the subgovernm ent 
(" iron triangles ") model. This model held that public policymak -
ing was the result of compromise and negotiation amon g a 
closed group of executi ve branch agency official s, interest 
groups , and members of legislative committees and subcommi t-
tees (Lowi , 1964; Ripley and Franklin , 1987). More recently, the 
closed subgovernrnent model has become outdated as an "advo-
cacy explosion " occurred , which resulted in the breakin g up of 
many closed iron triangles (Berry, 1997, 199-200). Heclo (1978) 
developed the " issue network " model of policymakin g as an al-
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ternative to the closed subgovemment model. The issue network 
model of policymaking held that in many different policy do-
mains, the closed "iron triangles " of the past had been replaced 
with "issue networks" containing many participants and greate r 
uncertainty. Notably, in the environmental policy domain , the 
rise of issue networks has led to more openness in environme ntal 
policymaking, as both environmental groups and business groups 
began to lobby government on environmental policies . 
Since many federal regulatory policies , such as environ-
mental protection laws , are implemented at the state and local 
government levels in the United States, an understanding of in-
terest group activities at the subnational level is important. Mar-
vel ( 1982, 28) conducted a study of state implementation of 
federal occupational safety regulations and found that " [s]tate 
implementors seem to be more susceptible to forces operative at 
the state and local levels than federal implementors. " As a con-
sequence , according to Marvel (1982, 28), the federal govern-
ment is more likely to aggressively pursue violations than state-
level implementers . In addition , Thompson (1981 , 1147) ana-
lyzed the implementation of state Workmen's Compensation 
Laws and found that labor and business group strength in a state 
was very important in determining implementation outcomes. 
Furthermore , Thompson and Scicchitano (1985 , 1986) found that 
the stronger labor unions were in a state, the more likely federa l 
Occupational Safety and Health Act laws would be implemented 
effectively. Thompson and Scicchitano (1985 , 686) note that bu-
reaucratic agencies implementing protective regulatory policies 
"face an adversarial milieu" where groups targeted by the policy 
fight its implementation . Thompson and Scicchitano (1986 , 177-
179) found that the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion was more aggressive toward the states during the 1970s than 
during the 1980s, which the author s attribute to the election of 
Ronald Reagan as U.S. President in 1980. 
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Also relevant is the case study done by Hayes , ( 1992). He ex-
,amined the adoption and intergovernmental implementation of 
the Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 
1977, which brought surface mining under federal regulation for 
the first time . Coal industry interests lobbied to have enforce-
ment of the policy conducted by the Interior Department through 
tht; states, while environmental groups prefened sole federal im-
plementation of the Act through the EPA. In this case, Haye s 
(1992 , 72-73) found that business interests have extensive influ-
ence on intergovernmental policy implementation becau se many 
states are heavily dependent on certain industries, such as coal 
and oil, for employment and development. States often avoid 
aggressive implementation of federal policies to avoid driving 
crucial industries to other states (Hayes 1992, 73). 
With respect to Canada, the relevant literature indicates that a 
c losed "e lite accommodation" model , similar to the "iron trian -
gle" model in the U.S., explains Canadian intergovernmental 
environmental policy implementation . According to Presthu s 
(1973) , the elite accommodation proces s in Canada is character -
ized as a closed system of consensual and cooperative policy-
making, which results in a few interests dominating the poli tical 
and policy processes . Building upon the work of Presthu s, Pros s 
(1975, 18-19) found that the elite accommodation model in Can-
ada resulted from two factors: (I) " ... that the policy proce ss ap-
pears to operate principally through two relatively closed 
·structures , the party system and the bureaucracy , botb of which 
achieve an apex in the Cabinet," and (2) "the fact that the Cana-
dian political system is based only to a limited extent on a plural -
is~ic, competitive , approach to decision making. " 
In addition, Pierce et al. (1992, 24) , in a study of intere t 
·groups in Ontario and Michigan, found that a greater centraliza -
tion .of power exists in the Province of Ontario than in the State 
of Michigan. In the Province of Ontario , a single governing po -
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litical party controls both the executive and legislative activities 
of the provincial government, while in Michigan, authority for 
environmental policymaking is spread across the governor, legis-
lative committees, an air quality commission, and the courts 
(Pierce et al. 1992, 24-25). Pierce found in interviews with inter-
est group officials that environmental groups in Ontario tended 
to focus most of their efforts on contacting top-level officials in 
the ministries implementing environmental policies (167), while 
Michigan groups contacted a wide range of participants in all 
three branches of government and were much more likely to file 
lawsuits in the courts to affect implementation than were groups 
in Ontario (159-160). 
Furthermore, Harrison (1996, 102) found that cooperative 
bargaining between regulating agencies and polluting industries 
" is the essence of the environmental regulatory process as it is 
practised [sic] in Canada;" according to him, "regulatory stan-
dards as well as schedules for individual polluters to come into 
compliance typically have been negotiated behind closed doors 
in a tripartite process involving federal and provincial officia ls 
and representatives of the polluting industry. " This closed rela-
tionship prevents groups promoting environmentally friendly 
policies from having significant input during implementation 
negotiations. 
As a result of provincial dominance of environmental policy 
implementation in Canada, dominant economic groups in differ-
ent provinces potentially can veto attempts by provincial gov-
ernments to adopt stricter environmental regulations. According 
to Skogstad (1996, 108-109) , provinces are reluctant to enact 
environmental policies that threaten their largest and most im-
portant industries, such as the oil and gas industry in Alberta, the 
pulp and paper and hydroelectricity industries in Quebec, and the 
forestry industry in British Columbia. As a consequence of pro-
vincial dominance in environmental policy in Canada, important 
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economic interests in province s generally prevail over national 
policy objectives (Skogstad 1996, 108). In the same vein, Rabe 
(I 999 , 290) states that "provinces clearly are reluctant in any 
way to alienate industries that might transfer investments to less-
rigorous provinces. As one provincial official noted, ' the bottom 
line is not environmental protection here, but economic devel-
opment. "' 
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
These accounts and findings suggest a framework for catego -
rizing interest group behaviors during the intergovernmental im-
plementation of environmental policy in Canada and the United 
States. The framework is illustrated in Table 1. Two important 
TABLE] 
INT EREST GRO P ACTIVITIES DURING THE INTERGOVER NME TAL 
IMPLEME NTAT ION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
Level of Governmental Fraementation 
-
Level of Subnational 
Government Low High 
Discretion 
-
Legislative Lobbying Multiple Institutional Low Lobbying (al the federal level) (at the federal level) 
High Bargaining Intergovernmental Lobbying 
factors emerge from the literature for explaining the behavior of 
interest groups during the subnational implementation of federal 
environmental policies. First, the literature indicate that the 
level of fragmentation in a political system is important. Frag-
mentation is high if groups have access to multiple political insti-
tutions and actors. Second, the literature indicates that the 
amount of discretion that subnational (i.e., state, provincial , and 
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local) governments possess during the intergovernmental imple-
mentation of federal environmental policies is important for un-
derstanding interest group activities during policy implemen-
tation. 
Legislative Lobbying Activities. The framework indicates that 
legislative lobbying activities at the federal level are likely to be 
practiced by interest groups when both governmental fragmenta-
tion and subnational government discretion are minimal. In such 
a situation , interest groups can be expected to focus their imple-
mentation efforts on lobbying members of the federal legislature 
to rewrite provisions of law in order to directly benefit certain 
groups , or to increase the discretion of implementing agencies. 
Without additional discretion, subnational governments have 
little ability to assist groups during the implementation process. 
In addition, in a system with litter fragmentation, groups lack the 
ability to use the courts and other institutions to stop or obstruct 
implementation. 
Bargaining Activities. When governmental fragmentation is 
low and subnational government discretion is high, the frame-
work hypothesizes that interest groups will engage in bargaining 
activities primarily at the state/provincial level. This bargaining 
classification reflects the dominance of the elite accommodatio n 
model in Canada. Elite accommodation in Canadian environ-
mental policy manifests itself through a closed, consensual, and 
cooperative negotiation process between provincial-level offi-
cials and economic interests with few access points for interest 
groups challenging the status quo. In Canada, fragmentation in 
environmental policymaking is minimized due to a number of 
reasons, such as provincial control of natural resources and the 
unified legislative-executive functions of the federal and provin-
cial governments (Hoberg, 2002). In addition, in Canada, t~e 
provinces have significant discretion to adopt and implement 
environmental polices. As a result, provincial environment al 
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agencies can use their significa nt discretion on environmental 
policy concerns to benefit economically important provincial 
industries (Skogstad 1996; Rabe 1999). 
Multipl e Institutional Lobbying Activities. In a federal politi-
cal system with high governmental fragmentation and low sub-
national government discretion , interest groups will find it in 
their interest to lobby many different political actors at the fed-
eral level to influence implementation. When state agency dis-
cretion is low, it is not worthwhile for an environmental group to 
focus significant efforts on a subnational agency with little dis-
cretion to write favorable rules. Rather , environmental interest 
groups are better served focusing their lobbying efforts on fed-
eral institutions, such as the EPA, the Congress, and the federal 
courts, to strike down or rewrite the procedures for implementa-
tion. 
In the United States, interest group behavior during the inter-
governmental implementation of federal environmental policie s 
can fall into either the Multiple Institutional Lobbying or Inter-
governmental Lobbying quadrants of the interest group behavior 
typology depending on the political situation in Washington , DC. 
Changes in presidential adminjstrations and party control in 
Washington, DC affect the level of discretion granted to state and 
local government agencies to implement federal environmental 
policies . Democrats tend to favor federal agencies implementing 
environmental policies, while Republicans tend to allow the 
states more discretion to implement environmental policie s. In-
terest group behavior generally falls into the Multiple Institu-
tional Lobbying quadrant during Democratic presidential 
administrations because Democrats tend to distrust state gov-
ernments more than Republican administrations with respect to 
environmental protection. 
Intergovernmental Lobbying Activities . Interest group behav-
ior in the United States generally falls into this category if state 
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governments are granted considerable discretion to implement 
federal environmental laws. The amount of discretion that state-
level agencies possess is determined by politics in Washington. 
According to the Intergovernmental Lobbying category, if a high 
level of subnational discretion and a high degree of fragmenta-
tion exist in a federal political system, interest groups will have 
many access points of influence. If a group does not achieve its 
desired policy objectives with a state or provincial environmental 
agency, it can go to the state legislature, the federal EPA, the 
Congress, and the judiciary to affect implementation. Groups can 
lobby the Congress to revise legal requirements in ways that re-
duce state agency discretion during policy implementation. In 
addition, in the United States, environmental interest groups can 
file lawsuits to both stop and force implementation. The Inter-
governmental Lobbying category resembles Hugh Heclo's 
(1978) "issue networks" model of policymaking, which is char-
acterized by openness, numerous participants, and multiple ac-
cess points of influence. The greater number and variety of 
access points that are available in th·e United States permit 
American environmental groups to participate in a wider range 
of activities to influence implementation outcomes than groups 
in Canada enjoy. 
CONCLUSION 
This research note develops a framework for categorizing in-
terest group activities during the intergovernmental implementa-
tion of environmental regulatory policies in Canada and the 
United States to compliment the existing literature on the role of 
interest groups in the public policy process. Understanding the 
role of interest groups in Canada and the United States is impor-
tant for assessing possible implementation hurdles and in pre-
dicting the future success of intergovernmental implementation 
efforts to protect the North American environment. The frame-
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work developed in this research note provides a foundation for 
conducting future bi-national studies of the role of interest 
groups during the implementation of Canada-U.S. environmental 
agreements, such as the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. 
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